9 Comments
User's avatar
tom a's avatar

I'm sure this is a bad question but why would "US banks are expanding loan books almost lock step in the decline in cash holdings (reserves)" reflect Fed tightening? Wouldn't US banks make less loans as rates go up?

Expand full comment
Meyrick Chapman's avatar

Hi Tom, partly it is an accounting identity issue - cash and securities grew with QE and had to displace something from bank balance sheets. The biggest something was loans. Now QT is reversing the process. However, there is a monetary angle because loan growth dampens and so prolongs tightening cycle.

Expand full comment
tom a's avatar

I'm still a bit confused. Fed B/S expands with QE (Fed buys securities from banks) > banks swap securities for more cash/reserves. Didn't Fed B/S expansion just transform securities into cash?

Expand full comment
Dan's avatar

Thanks for pointing this out Meyrick. Traditionally the quarter end turn coincided with extra demand for funding ie Q3 2019. That no longer seems to be the case, at least in 2022. Do you think that’s a result of still being in an excess reserve position or a result of the changing nature of bank exposures as you highlight in your post? Thanks

Expand full comment
Meyrick Chapman's avatar

The repo market is signalling bank balance sheet contraction. But as money is stuck in the wrong place it means an exaggerated drain from financial markets. This is a new regime. Very interesting.

Expand full comment
Dan's avatar

Thanks for your reply. How exactly is the repo market signaling balance sheet contraction? That’s not a conclusion I would have drawn. Thanks for interacting.

Expand full comment
Meyrick Chapman's avatar

Banks are refusing to accommodate MMF at quarter-end. Therefore repo rates fall and RRP rises.

Expand full comment
Dan's avatar

Excellent, thanks!

Expand full comment
Meyrick Chapman's avatar

QE forced banks to increase reserves ( cash ). That is well known. In addition, Fed QE bought securities from banks but banks acted as intermediaries. The ultimate seller was institutional investors. Banks were insiders in this policy, so (at the margin) banks accumulated additional securities (bonds) to arbitrage the policy. This is now in reverse.

Expand full comment